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Abstract. Using data from a World Bank survey carried
out in Bangladesh during the period 1991-1992, we compare the
impact of micro￿nance programs and other types of credit on
agricultural investment. After controlling for several measurable
determinants of credit agreements, such as interest rates and col-
lateral, estimates still show that micro￿nance programs are more
likely to increase variable input expenditure than informal and
bank credit are able to do. This provides evidence that micro-
￿nance incentive devices (joint responsibility, peer monitoring,
social sanctions, future credit denial in case of default, etc.), per-
haps together with other services associated with programs, are
e⁄ective in order to promote a productive use of funds.
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11 Introduction
In recent years, a signi￿cant branch of the literature has focused on the
impact that micro￿nance ￿ mainly operating through group lending￿has
on poverty reduction. Many studies analyze the impact of the major
lending programs on some households￿and ￿rms￿behavior, such as per-
capita consumption, labor supply, children school enrollment (Pitt and
Khandker, 1997 and 1998; Pitt, 1999), or business pro￿ts and revenues
(Madajewicz, 1999).
All these studies provide evidence that microcredit programs can
reduce poverty through capital provision and through some additional
bene￿ts directly linked to program participation (non-credit services),
such as ￿nancial education, the observation of basic health rules, skill
training and consciousness development.
What is not clear is to what extent these programs are better than
other types of credit contracts ￿ informal and bank ones￿in order to
reduce poverty. In fact, impact studies are focused on group-based pro-
grams alone, while much of the remaining information concerning other
sources of credit is missing. This provides biased estimates for the per-
formance of these programs and gives no room for policy implications
concerning the opportunity of replacing traditional credit with alterna-
tive instruments, such as group lending.
Moreover, it is crucial to de￿ne what we intend by "reducing poverty",
and much depends on the time horizon we refer to. In a low income
framework, one of the main purposes of lending, and especially of micro-
￿nance, should be that of providing the basis for improving standards
of living by increasing not only present (credit-based) consumption, but
also future (possibly self-sustained) one.
However, in order to achieve self sustainability, credit should not be
myopically consumed, but rather invested in productive activities. It is
no surprise that this recommendation bears a resemblance to one of the
sixteen decisions promoted by the Grameen Bank. It states: "During
the plantation seasons, we shall plant as many seedlings as possible".
Therefore, it seems that investment ￿ and savings as well￿should re-
ceive more attention by the micro￿nance sector (B￿ge, 2004). However,
to the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical works trying to in-
vestigate the impact of microlending programs and other types of credit
on investment and this paper tries to shed light on this issue.
Using data from a survey carried out by the World Bank during
years 1991 and 1992 in Bangladesh, we compare the e⁄ectiveness of
group-based lending programs, informal and bank credit on agricultural
investment.
We consider three major institutions granting microlending in Bangladesh
2(the Grameen Bank, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee,
and the Bangladesh Rural Development Board). We also add to this
category all other secondary non-government organizations. On the op-
posite side, we include in the informal class all the loans obtained from
landlords, input suppliers, shopkeepers, employers, relatives and friends.
Banks are commercial, as well as government owned.
Under the assumption that farmers are input constrained, credit of
whatever source should have a positive impact on investment. Following
Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Madajewicz (1999) we use three di⁄erent
estimation techniques in order to identify the impact of di⁄erent lending
contracts on investment, starting from Two-Stage Least Squares, then
adding two other approaches more suited to address both the problem
of the censoring nature of credit and the selection bias that originates
from endogenous credit market participation1.
We ￿nd that all credit sources achieve the goal of rising agricul-
tural investment and this can be explained by less binding liquidity con-
straints. However, after controlling for measurable di⁄erences in the
structure of the three credit agreements ￿ such as interest rates and col-
lateral2￿we ￿nd that micro￿nance programs are still more likely than
informal and bank credit to positively a⁄ect investment. The implication
is that some other non measurable factors are supposed to determine the
better performance of group lending.
At a ￿rst glance one may think about the role of non-credit services,
such as the mentioned recommendation of planting as many seedlings as
possible. However, this ￿good-behavior rule￿ , is quite obvious for those
who carry out an agricultural activity, independently from the type of
lender one may face. And, by itself, it would probably lack enforcement
power if incentives were not set up along with the basic statement, like
in the case of some other principles included in the sixteen decisions.
In fact, it is not easy that people are willing to follow simple sugges-
tions if they have not convenience to do so. In particular, it has been
shown that poorer individuals ￿ the target of microlending programs￿
have a higher rate of time preference with respect to richer ones (Lawrance,
1Much weight has been given to the problem of endogeneity. As Pitt and Khandker
(1998) point out, it is possible to summarize the sources of endogeneity in three broad
classes, and within these classes it is important to distinguish pure endogeneity from
self selection into a particular program. Since the endogeneity argument represents
one of the most important features of the econometric exercise, we will discuss this
topic in detail further on.
2Usually, within a credit agreement, the requirement adopted to enforce the pro-
ductive use of funds, and debt recovery at the end, is the presence of collateral.
However, one of the main features of the Grameen model of micro￿nance is the
absence of any form of physical collateral.
31991). Thus, micro￿nance borrowers might be tempted to dramatically
rise present consumption rather than buying inputs3.
Conversely, much of the incentives to behave correctly ￿ i.e. invest
more and consume less￿might re￿ ect the type of punishment that fol-
lows a default of the borrower. A considerable number of development
economists assert that the strength of micro￿nance, and particularly of
group lending programs, is mainly due the peer monitoring system and
the presence of social sanctions for the borrower in case of misbehavior
(Stiglitz, 1990; Besley and Coate, 1995; Ghatak and N￿ Guinanne, 1999).
Social sanctions can be interpreted as reciprocity denial and exclusion
from the community life. Typically they are imposed by individuals that
are close enough to the borrower so as to be able to observe her/his good
or bad behavior at a relatively low cost. These feature is commonly
interpreted as a form of social collateral.
Indeed, a very important device set up by micro￿nance institutions
in order to enforce good behaviors ￿ and to increase repayment rates as
well￿is the joint responsibility of group members for the repayment of
the entire sum lent, along with future credit denial imposed to all peers
in case of default of the group (joint punishment).
Thus, since net revenues and future credit availability for each peer
depend upon the e⁄ort of all group members, this stimulates reciprocal
monitoring at a relatively low cost and creates the basis for the imposi-
tion of social sanctions in case of bad behavior4.
One may reasonably think that, due to close relationships between
borrowers and informal lenders, the latter also have easy access to the
information concerning the actions of the former, and can eventually
impose social sanctions in case of misbehavior.
However, the e⁄ect of this social stigma can end up to be smoothed in
informal lending. In fact, some moneylender may disregard e⁄ort since
she/he can be compensated by physical collateral in case of default.
Furthermore, the threat of social sanctions can be ine⁄ective when the
relationship is too close (i.e. when lenders are represented by relatives
and friends)5.
3"A small income, other things being equal, tends to produce a high level of
impatience, partly from the thought that provision for the present is necessary for
the present itself and for the future as well, and partly for the lack of foresight and
self-control" (Fisher 1930).
4As in Dalla Pellegrina (2006), the di⁄erence between economic and social sanc-
tions in contracts without collateral is that the former are a share of the borrower￿ s
output, which may depend on e⁄ort and luck, while the latter are negatively cor-
related to e⁄ort. Hence, the observability of the borrower￿ s actions is a necessary
condition in order to apply social rather than economic sanctions.
5That is why Grameen requires that group members do not belong to the same
4The argument holds to a greater extent in bank agreements, where
collateral is more often required (see Section 3) and borrowers￿actions
are observed only at a relatively high cost due to the considerable dis-
tance intercurring between the counterparts.
Our results seem to somehow re￿ ect the ranking described so far
with respect to the system of incentives set up by group lending. This
ranking shows that micro￿nance/group lending unmeasurable charac-
teristics promote a higher rete of investment ￿ which can be interpreted
as a proxy of e⁄ort￿than any other type of contract, while informal
agreements perform better than bank ones.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give
an overview of the di⁄erences between microcredit, banks and informal
moneylenders in Bangladesh. Section 3 illustrates the dataset. Section
4 turns to the estimation techniques adopted. In section 5 we discuss
results. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Micro￿nance institutions, informal moneylenders
and banks in Bangladesh
This section gives a brief overview of the role of microcredit institutions
located in Bangladesh and compares these institutions with the informal
credit market and banks.
2.1 Micro￿nance institutions
The major organizations providing microcredit to low income households
in Bangladesh are: the Grameen Bank (GB), the Bangladesh Rural Ad-
vancement Committee (BRAC) and the Bangladesh Rural Development
Board￿ s RD-12 Program (BRDB), together with some other minor non-
governmental institutions.
The Grameen Bank, established in 1976 by Professor Muhammad
Yunus with the aim of creating a group-based credit system able to
serve the poorest of the poor, has now more than 2.4 million borrowers,
95 percent of whom are women. With 1,170 branches, the GB provides
services in 40,000 villages, covering more than half of the total villages
in Bangladesh.
The positive impact of the GB presence on poor and formerly poor
borrowers has been documented in many independent studies carried
household.
5out by external agencies including the World Bank, the International
Food Research Policy Institute (IFPRI) and the Bangladesh Institute of
Development Studies (BIDS).
The BRAC was established as a relief and rehabilitation organiza-
tion in 1972 after the Bangladesh Liberation War by Mr. Fazle Hasan
Abed. Over the years, BRAC has gradually evolved into a large and mul-
tifaceted development organization, serving6 more than 60,000 villages
over 86,000 in Bangladesh, corresponding to 4.07 millions of borrowers
and covering almost all the country area.
Furthermore, the Agriculture Extension Programme of BRAC aims
to increase the nutritional and income status of the rural households by
increasing agricultural production through technology transfer and qual-
ity input supply. The Agriculture Programme is also running a num-
ber of collaborative projects with Bangladesh Rice Research Institutes
(BRRI) and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI).
The BRDB, transformed in 1982 into a nation-wide institution af-
ter the success of the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP)
launched in 1972, is the prime government agency engaged in rural devel-
opment and poverty alleviation. BRDB basically operates by organizing
the small and marginal farmers into cooperative societies for increasing
agricultural production through improved means and by forming formal
and informal groups of landless men and distressed women who jointly
borrow to start income generating activities in the rural areas.
With 63,000 primary agricultural cooperatives promoted and 28% of
the bene￿ciaries that have crossed the poverty line, statistics assess that
BRDB is now one of the pioneers in poverty alleviation.
Credit programs o⁄ered by the GB, the BRAC and the BRDB,
mainly operate through group lending. The system relies on solidar-
ity groups of four to six persons consisting of co-opted members coming
from the same background and trusting each other.
2.2 Informal lenders
The class of informal contracts is represented by suppliers and mer-
chants, landlords, relatives and friends. In general, borrowing from in-
formal moneylenders has the advantage of having immediate approval
and ￿ exible amounts of money. Moreover, they frequently accord debt
renegotiation in case of di¢ culty with repayment at maturity.
On one hand, loans from suppliers and other merchants are extended
to farmers mainly against the standing crops of the current season. Such
6As in the case of the GB, credit services also rely on group landing.
6loans are almost exclusively short-term based, and are recovered through
the purchase of the output at a price agreed in advance, which is always
below the market one. Most of the credit provided by these agents is
carried out during the ￿ owering or ripening season of the crop, when
contractors need advances for inputs.
It is worth to mention that these lenders are often engaged in ac-
tivities like buying or selling agricultural inputs and outputs, thus they
clearly have some advantage in lending to farmers, because this rises the
incentives for the latter to trade agricultural inputs and outputs with
them.
On the other hand, landlords are typically wealthy persons linked to
the borrower by a close relationship and are usually in￿ uent members
of the community. Typically they set much higher interest rates than
micro￿nance programs7, and often require physical collateral.
Finally, relatives and friends usually lend at lower interest rates and
do not require collateral.
2.3 Banks
The Banking sector accounts for a substantial share of of the ￿nancial
system (55% of the total) and is dominated by 4 Nationalized Com-
mercial Banks, which together control more than 54% of deposits and
operate with 3,388 branches.
There are also ￿ve specialized banks. In particular, two of them
(Bangladesh Krishi Bank, which is included in our sample, and Rajshahi
Krishi Unnayan Bank) were created to meet the credit needs of the
agricultural sector. Twenty-eight ￿nancial institutions are also operating
in Bangladesh although they manage a reduced quantity of funds with
respect to commercial and specialized banks.
As common in the literature on less developed countries, the main
problem with banks is raised by asymmetric information between lenders
and borrowers, often due to the long distance between the two, and also
to scarce infrastructures. The consequence of this phenomenon is clearly
credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
This problem is exacerbated when borrowers are poor and lack any
adequate collateral. Thus, bank lending is not very frequent for people
living in rural areas of the country.
7Interest rates of 150 per cent and more are not di¢ cult to observe. These interest
rates are to be compared with 15 to 20 per cent set by program lending. See next
section for further details.
73 The data
The dataset consists of a sample of 516 households. These are rice
farmers selected from a survey carried out on 1,798 households in rural
Bangladeshi villages by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies
at the World Bank in 1991/928.
The original sample consists of three randomly selected villages from
each of the 29 districts (thanas) surveyed. In 24 of these districts, a
microcredit program (Grameen, BRAC or BRDB) had been in operation
for at least three years. A total of 20 households in each village were
surveyed.
Traditional rice was the main crop in Bangladesh at the time of the
survey9. We deliberately focused on this crop because including high
yield rice or other crops in the econometric analysis would typically orig-
inate a selection problem which is already present in the credit market
(see next section for details).
Moreover, although the survey has been conducted three times dur-
ing the period, we had to concentrate on the Aman season (November-
February), which is also called the ￿peak season￿for rice crops, since
much information is missing during the ￿lean seasons￿ .
Table 1 reports statistics emerging from the sample of rice farmers
and compares them with those of the full sample. Discrepancies are very
small, suggesting that rice farmers do not behave and are not treated
di⁄erently from the rest of the population surveyed. Therefore, there
should be no bias due to sample-selection criteria.
In the sample of rice farmers 222 households borrow from micro￿-
nance institutions (65 per cent of total loans made), 66 from informal
lenders (22 per cent), and 49 from banks (13 per cent), for a total of 337
borrowing households10.
Credit of whatever nature is the amount of borrowed funds from each
type of lender11. Average microloans are 6,622 taka, as compared with
8Although micro￿nance has made further improving steps in recent years, still
group lending is the core of credit services provided by these institutions. Informal
and bank credit are also granting almost the same services as in 1991/1992. Hence,
the dataset seems not to supply aged information with respect to the issues raised in
this paper.
9At the time of the survey only a few farmers were cultivating high-yield crops.
Only after the devastating ￿ oods of 1998, some governmental and non-governmental
organizations introduced high-yield hybrids.
10A few number of households (six) contemporaneously borrow from di⁄erent
sources. In order to avoid correlations among the errors in the estimated equations
(see next section) they have been dropped from our sample.
11Some authors treat credit as a binary variable. We instead use a continuous
measure of principal because a higher investment should not depend on the simple
8a lower average principal for informal loans (3,743 taka). The average
principal is substantially higher (15,071 taka) for bank loans. Moreover,
principal is slightly lower for rice farmers as compared to the entire sam-
ple, at least as long as households borrow from micro￿nance institutions
or moneylenders.
Interest rate is 16 per cent on average in both micro￿nance and bank
contracts, as compared with a mean of 50 per cent in the informal credit
market. In particular, informal credit rates considerably di⁄er across
the sample with a standard deviation of 63 in the full sample and of 61
in the sub-sample of rice farmers12.
In the dataset there are no observations concerning the value of col-
lateral. However, basing on information about whether collateral has
been actually required, a dummy was built and used as a control vari-
able. From Table 1 it is possible to observe that informal moneylenders
require some collateral only on 13 per cent of loans, while banks do it on
60 per cent of loans (67 per cent when loans are directed to rice farmers).
[Table 1 about here]
Summarizing, statistics in Table 1 draw the following path: banks
grant larger sums with respect to micro￿nance organizations and infor-
mal lenders. Interest rates are almost ￿xed in microcredit programs and
bank loans, while they are considerably higher and volatile on informal
ones. However, banks require collateral on a very high share of loans.
Collateral is sometimes required in informal agreements ￿ but not often￿
and never in micro￿nance programs.
We use a continuous measure of land to capture the role of poten-
tial collateral13. Following Pitt (1999), we treat land as exogenous with
respect to credit. In fact, land market in South Eastern countries like
Bangladesh emerges to be very static (see for example results in Rosen-
zweig and Wolpin, 1985, on Indian survey data). Therefore, it seems
plausible to assume that credit is not used to buy land. Moreover, this
variable also represents a possible exogenous proxy of wealth.
Besides land we control for two other variables as proxies of collat-
eral, that is the ownership of a house ￿ which in our data emerges to be
choice between borrowing or not borrowing, but rather on total credit availability.
12High interest rates might re￿ ect some moneylender￿ s usurious behavior. This
possibility has been widely discussed in the literature (see Basu, 1984; Rahman,
1977 and Bhardan, 1979, to mention just a few).
13Since actual collateral required is observable only if a household is borrowing
money, we cannot use this variable for credit estimation purposes.
9sometimes required as a collateral by banks￿and transport ownership14.
Since house and transport dummies are potentially endogenous with re-
spect to credit (they might be bought with a loan) our dummy variables
"house" and "transport" take the value 1 only when the item has been
inherited, is a gift, or it is part of a dowry.
Investment is interpreted as working capital, that is per-acre variable
costs. These costs include expenditure for seeds, fertilizers, pesticides,
water and tillage costs15.
We also consider semi-￿xed assets, which consist of the value of bul-
locks, ploughs and other agricultural equipment16. Land is not included
among these determinants because, as we discussed above, it is a prop-
erly ￿xed asset in this economy and credit is rarely used to buy land.
Table 2 reports summary statistics on investment and semi-￿xed cap-
ital stock.
[Table 2 about here]
Investment is 345 taka per acre, with a standard deviation of 42217.
The stock of semi-￿xed assets is 3,007 taka per acre, with a standard
deviation of 6,144 (Table 2).
Furthermore, in every regression we include a set of personal vari-
ables, such as age and education of household head and spouse, the
gender of the household head, the number of persons in the household,
their religion, as well as variables such as land tenure (sharecropper or
￿xed rent).
14In the survey, if a person has been granted a loan, he/she is asked whether a
collateral has been required by the lender. In case the answer is positive, the borrower
is asked to include the collateral in some category. These are: land, buildings, gold,
personal guarantee and "other". Since some borrowers choose "other" it is possible
that bicycles, motorbikes, hand or horse-carts, boats and rickshaws belong to this
category.
15We exclude labor costs the analysis for reasons connected with the possible en-
dogenous nature of an instrumental variable (illness) discussed in the following sec-
tion.
16We do not have information on semi-￿xed capital ￿ ows, since the dataset provides
almost all missing values for the di⁄erence between the assets owned after the loan
has been obtained and those owned before. However, we include this stock measure
in order to ￿ at least partially￿verify whether credit might have some signi￿cant e⁄ect
on capital. If this were the case, signi￿cant impacts on both investment and capital
should be weighted in order to assess the better performance of one or the other type
of credit.
17Labor expenditure per acre is only 12 taka on average, thus its exclusion for
reasons due to endogeneity of variable input expenditure (see next section for details)
should not dramatically a⁄ect it.
10The database provides also useful records on the number of relatives
who are alive and those who own land. The ￿rst variable is very helpful
to measure potential transfers18 for the household.
Moreover, the number of relatives who are alive represents a useful
measure of the social net surrounding the household, which can be a
good support in case, for example, one aims at forming a group in order
to borrow from micro￿nance institutions.
Finally, dummy variables are built in order to correct for district
￿xed e⁄ects19, including prices of various goods, which are common to
each community. We summarize all variables in the Appendix.
4 Estimation techniques
The empirical work aims at testing whether micro￿nance programs are
e⁄ective in inducing a reduction of the quantity of funds used for un-
productive purposes and an increase of investment. The empirical work
seems interesting from at least two standpoints.
First, it is widely assessed that bank loans are extremely ine¢ cient
in order to promote borrowers￿e⁄ort in a setup where substantial asym-
metric information occurs (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Ghosh et al., 2000).
Conversely, the presence of social ties and the mechanism of peers￿
delegated-monitoring can make group lending work in such contexts.
Thus, it seems interesting to check if data are consistent with theory.
Second, what occurs in the informal sector, where social ties are likely
to be e⁄ective and possibly incur in determining borrowers￿attitudes
towards e⁄ort?
In order to pursue the objective we have in mind we need to investi-
gate the mechanism underlying the process of selection into each credit
market. This is a crucial issue in order to address the problem of the
endogenous nature of credit with respect to investment and the paucity
of instruments available to correct for this bias.
So far, the selection mechanism for micro￿nance loans has been
deeply investigated (Pitt and Khandker, 1998). One of its main ex-
ogenous determinants has been recognized to be the eligibility rule for
programs, that is the ownership of less than 0.5 acres of cultivable land.
Thus, informal and banking sectors might be residual markets for all
individuals that are rationed out of microcredit programs.
18A large literature provides evidence for the endogeneity of e⁄ective transfers in
similar contexts (Guiso and Jappelli, 2002).
19Village ￿xed-e⁄ects cannot be used due to the relatively low number of observa-
tions in the sample.
11However, it may also be the case that some agents choose to self-
select into other markets for di⁄erent reasons, like a particular rela-
tionship with the lender, the need of contract terms ￿ exibility, or even
because, given the known unproductive destination of funds, they are
excluded from group formation. Nonetheless, the empirical analysis is
extremely precious to shed light on factors that push borrowers towards
the informal market or banks.
In this section we present the equations estimated in the econometric
exercise, then we brie￿ y discuss some sources of endogeneity that fre-
quently arise when dealing with selection issues. Finally, we illustrate in
detail the used estimation procedure.
4.1 The equations
We estimate the investment (equation (1)), conditioned on the total
amount of credit borrowed (equations (2)-(4)) and on a set of control
variables representing household preferences and technology.
The complete set of reduced form equations estimated is the follow-
ing:








ij￿A + ￿jA + ￿ijA (1)
C
N
ij = Xij￿N + Z
C
ij￿N + ￿jN + ￿ijN (2)
C
I
ij = Xij￿I + Z
C
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C
B
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C
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where i stands for household, which is the unit of observation, and j
refers to the district.
Aij is per-acre investment; CN
ij is the cumulative quantity of credit
borrowed by the household from GB, BRAC, BRDB and NGOs; CI
ij
is the cumulative quantity of informal loans, and CB
ij is the cumulative
quantity of bank loans.
Xij are general characteristics of the household common to all equa-
tions (such as religion, age of the household head and education, number
of household members, and a dummy capturing if the household head is
male) as well as technological features (land tenure).
ZA
ij are either measurable characteristics of credit contracts such as
actual interest rate and collateral required20, or elements that a⁄ect in-
vestment behavior but not credit; while ZC
ij are characteristics of the
20As we previously mentioned, these cannot be used to determine credit transac-
tions since credit is censored and we observe these variables only if credit is positive.
12household that a⁄ect credit transactions but not other household￿ s es-
timated behaviors (total land owned and other measures of potential
collateral)21.
￿jN; ￿jI; ￿jB and ￿jA are district speci￿c-e⁄ects, while ￿ijN, ￿ijI,
￿ijB, and ￿ijA are idiosyncratic errors, such as E(￿ij:jXij;ZC
ij;￿j:) = 0 in
equations (2)-(4), and E(￿ij:jXij;Cij;ZA
ij;￿j:) = 0 in equation (1). The
covariance matrix is assumed to be diagonal22.
In the next subsection we discuss some endogeneity issues concerning
the relationship between our variables CN
ij and Aij, then we illustrate
the estimation procedure and the set of available instruments adopted
to solve for the bias arising from this problem.
4.2 Sources of bias
As pointed out by Pitt and Khandker (1998), the sources of bias that
may arise when treating programs e⁄ects can be summarized into three
major classes.
The ￿rst class originates from nonrandom placement of credit pro-
grams. This problem mainly concerns micro￿nance credit and may be
due to the fact that programs are most frequently allocated in poorer
districts or more ￿ ood-prone areas. Treating program placement as ran-
dom can lead to a downward bias of program e⁄ects, as discussed in
Pitt, Rosenzweig and Gibbons (1993) and Heckman (1990). The same
argument holds for banks, that may not be uniformly distributed across
the sample.
The second class of bias is related to unmeasured district attributes
that a⁄ect both credit transactions and household behavior. Climate
conditions and a high propensity to natural disasters, among the others,
are important characteristics a⁄ecting both these variables, especially
when dealing with agricultural aspects. We correct for these two forms of
bias using district ￿xed e⁄ects in both credit and investment equations.
The last source of bias concerns unmeasured household features that
a⁄ect both credit transactions and household behavior (selection mech-
anism). These are intrinsic characteristics or personal qualities, like
ability and individual aptitudes: it may occur, for example, that more
skilled farmers are also more able in obtaining one type of credit, and
this would wrongly attribute to that type of credit the higher investment
that might instead be due to a higher ability.
21Variables included in ZC
ij cannot be interpreted as exogenous instruments since
they can be correlated with the term ￿ijA.
22Two out of three estimation techniques adopted provide evidence of no correlation
among the errors of the equations in the system (see next sections for details).
13Such unobservable characteristics may originate the endogenous na-
ture of credit with respect to investment. In fact, the decision of bor-
rowing and the choice of a speci￿c credit market can be driven by some
unmeasurable factor falling in the error term. Problems of this kind are
traditionally solved using instrumental variables when these are avail-
able.
The selection system originated by programs exogenous eligibility
rules or by the presence of an exogenous shock can be exploited to cor-
rect for the market selection mechanism. In fact, in order to solve the
problem of endogeneity of di⁄erent nature, we need to augment the ZC
matrix with variables that are not correlated with the error term of both
cumulative credit and investment equations.
Finally, another source of bias not related to endogeneity is the cen-
soring nature of credit. In the sample of traditional rice farmers, invest-
ment is a continuous variable, but only a portion of these households is
borrowing money. Credit is thus censored in equations (2)-(4).
Thus, speci￿c Tobit or selection models are set up in order to cor-
rectly estimate censored cumulative credit. Moreover, by means of the
selection model we are able to generate further instruments for cumula-
tive credit, namely the Mills ratio found in the ￿rst stage of the selection
procedure. We will illustrate the methodology used to correct biases in
the following section.
4.3 Estimators
Pitt and Khandker use a quasi-experimental survey design to provide sta-
tistical identi￿cation of program e⁄ects in a LIML context. They identify
the e⁄ect of participation in a credit program on some households out-
comes exploiting the information coming from not eligible households in
program districts and the exogenous rule of half an acre of land as a
proxy for eligibility.
However, this information is relatively weak in order to instrument
informal credit in particular, which is available in every village and does
not imply any eligibility rule. Moreover, the presence of a lager number
of equations makes that method cumbersome in our case.
The estimation procedure illustrated below goes through the follow-
ing scheme: ￿rst, we adopt an estimator that treats the problem of
endogeneity of credit by augmenting the matrix ZC
ij with exogenous in-
struments. We further consider the issue of the censoring nature of credit
and the possibility of detecting some credit market selection mechanism
from household measurable characteristics.
14The ￿rst technique is a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). Here we
use ￿xed e⁄ects to correct for nonrandom allocation of credit and un-
measured district characteristics that a⁄ect both credit transactions and
household investment. Instruments23 are also used to further correct for
unmeasured household features that a⁄ect both credit transactions and
investment.
However, as described above, 2SLS techniques do not consider the
censoring nature of credit. Thus, a Two-Stage Tobit estimator (2STobit)
is adopted to treat all sources of bias cited above together with the
censoring nature of credit.
A third estimator based on Heckman (1976) also makes the market
selection device explicit in the credit transaction equations correcting
for the fraction of selection bias that is ascribable to its observable de-
terminants.
The way 2STobit and Heckman estimators are built follows the pro-
cedure of instrumental variables, that is replacing endogenous regressors
with their expected value in order to eliminate unmeasurable error com-
ponents, but there are clearly several di⁄erences in the way the predicted
values of the endogenous variables are computed.
The 2STobit uses a Tobit model to estimate predicted credit trans-
actions, augmented with all exogenous instruments for credit. The pre-
dicted expected values of credit are then plugged into the behavioral
equation for investment (1)24 and ￿nally these are estimated with stan-
dard maximum likelihood techniques.
Predicted values are computed in the following way:
b C = E(CjXij;Z
C








ij; c ￿C; c ￿C
" ) dC
￿ (5)
where C = CN; CI; or CB.
The Heckman estimator follows the same procedure as the one de-
scribed above, but this method includes a credit market selection cor-
rection term which is used as an additional instrument for credit. In
general, sample selection bias refers to problems where the dependent
variable is only observed for a restricted, non-random sample. In this
particular case, one only observes household cumulative program bor-
rowing if the household has joined a program. Conversely, household
23See next sub-section for a discussion on available instruments.
24We also estimated a di⁄erent version of the 2STobit and Heckman models, using
the corrected ￿tted values of endogenous variables as instruments for the actual
ones, together with all other exogenous instruments. However, results did not deeply
changed with respect to the Two-stage method illustrated above.
15cumulative informal or bank borrowing are observable if the household
has agreed to an informal or a bank contract.
We thus estimate a ￿rst stage Probit model to predict the probability
of participation and in the second-stage, we estimate the expected value
of cumulative borrowing including inverse Mills ratios as regressors.
According to this type of model, the participation e⁄ect does not
show up as an eligibility dummy variable (an exogenous proxy for par-
ticipation), but rather in the fact that the constant terms and betas
may di⁄er from the sample of program borrowers to that of informal
borrowers. Predicted values of credit are computed according to (5).
4.4 Instruments
As we discussed above, endogeneity basically arises due to some unmea-
surable qualities, like ability and individual aptitudes that are correlated
to both credit demand and investment.
We ￿rst use an exogenous measure of eligibility for credit program
participation to instrument credit. In fact, for some microcredit pro-
grams, such as the Grameen, the ownership of less than half an acre of
cultivable land25 constitutes the main eligibility rule. Pitt and Khand-
ker (1998) argue that credit is rarely used to buy land due to the static
features of the land market in Eastern Asia. Hence, the ownership of
less than half an acre of land seems a suitable instrument since it is
exogenous with respect to credit26.
Since our sample includes both eligible and non eligible households for
microcredit programs, we built a dummy variable named "target" which
takes the value 1 if a household is eligible for entering a micro￿nance
program and zero otherwise.
From Table 3, one can observe that 84 per cent of rice farmers that
borrow from micro￿nance institutions ful￿l the eligibility criteria for a
program, while among informal borrowers 65 per cent own less that half
an acre of land. Bank customers are instead less frequently eligible for
programs (39 per cent).
From these data we can presume that eligibility induces borrowers
to self select into program lending, and possibly that it discriminates
25So far, the use of this eligibility rule as an instrument has been a widely debated
issue. See Morduch (1998) and Pitt (1999).
26Controlling for land ￿ and also for land owned by parents and other relatives￿
should capture the wealth status of the household. This leaves the error term in each
equation free from wealth components and should not arise endogeneity issues due
their presence. However, ability and individual aptitudes are still non measurable
and still may involve some bias.
16among non eligible households that, by contrast, are conveyed towards
bank lending. However, the fact that 65 per cent of the households
borrowing from moneylenders are eligible for micro￿nance programs,
induces thinking that non eligibility is not the main reason that pushes
borrowers to look for informal ￿nancing.
At this point is worth thinking about the characteristics of informal
lending. We discussed so far about the particular ￿ exibility granted by
informal lenders with respect to the amount borrowed and the possibility
of debt renegotiation in case of di¢ culty with repayment at maturity.
This ￿ exibility becomes crucial when households have to face unexpected
shocks27.
In particular, one looks for ￿ exibility when the causes that induce
borrowing are associated with uncertainty for the future. Think for
example about a serious disease. It is not easy to know at the time
of diagnosis how will a certain person react to drugs, and how long it
will take to recover. Thus ￿ exibility ￿ in particular in the reimbursement
schedule￿becomes a strong determinant in order to select a lender.
In the dataset we have information about cases of illness in each
household. Some of them seem to be endogenous due to correlation
with personal features like behavioral attitudes and ability, that can be
present in the error term of the investment equation.
However, as opposite to other types of illness28, a bacterial infection29
like tuberculosis cannot be easily connected with unmeasurable personal
characteristics of the household, such as ability. Neither it seems to be
correlated with our exogenous proxies of wealth or with average loan
principal30.
27See for example Udry (1994).
28We also have observations concerning stomach problems, diarrhea, ￿ u, which
might be avoided through better hygienic standards or other kinds of precautions.
However, the fact of adopting these correct behaviors can be connected with ability.
For example, a more informed individual can avoid these types of illness via cor-
rect hygiene behaviors and can also acquire more information regarding investment
strategies.
29Tuberculosis (TB) is an infectious diseases of man and other animals caused by
species of Mycobacterium. It is primarily spread by coughing and sneezing and is
more frequent in highly populated countries (especially in South.Eastern Asia) and
urban centers. For more detailed information see the World Health Organization
website (www.who.int).
30Tables A6 and A7 in the appendix reports some t-tests for equal means across
the sub-samples of households whose members have been a⁄ected by tuberculosis
and households whose members have not. Statistics in Table A6 provide evidence
that there is no correlation between tuberculosis and our proxies for wealth (i.e. land
owned by the household members and their relatives). Thus in our sample it does
not seem that richer individuals are less a⁄ected by the desease than poorer ones.
Moreover (Table A7), the null hypothesis of equal average principal for households
17Moreover, tuberculosis requires a long time and continuous treat-
ment to recover, thus credit is supposed to be used to ￿nance such large
expenditures. Due to these characteristics we use the number of cases
of tuberculosis in order to instrument credit, and particularly informal
credit31.
In Table 3 we also report statistics concerning other deseases ￿ measles
and malaria￿that may randomly a⁄ect household members. However,
due to their scarce incidence in our sample, we cannot rely upon them
as very powerful instruments.
[Table 3 about here]
5 Results
In this section we present estimates of the model described by equations
(1-4). Results are reported in Tables 4-6. Table 4 refers to credit market
selection mechanism; Table 5 refers to cumulative credit transactions,
and Table 6 illustrates the estimated parameters for investment.
In this section we discuss results obtained with the most reliable
among the three econometrics techniques previously described. In fact,
as we already mentioned, only the Heckman procedure accounts for all
biases due to endogeneity, censoring nature of credit and self-selection.
We leave all the results provided by the other two techniques in the
Appendix. In particular, Tables A2-A4 and A3-A5 refer to 2SLS and
Tobit estimation respectively. Tables A4 and A5 instead focus on the
estimation of the investment equation.
5.1 Credit market selection
Table 4 reports estimates of the ￿rst stage (Probit) of the Heckman
procedure. Participation e⁄ects are evident in this case. First of all,
it is possible to observe that the eligibility rule based on half an acre
of land positively and signi￿cantly a⁄ects participation in micro￿nance
programs (second column)32.
Furthermore, the parameter associated to the variable ￿target￿ in
the estimation of bank lending (fourth column) is negative. The fact of
whose members have or have not been a⁄ected by TBC is not rejected.
31From Table 3 it is evident that a higher presence of household whose members
have been hit by this disease is registered in the informal credit market.
32This is in line with Pitt and Khandker (1998).
18being a target household is instead not signi￿cant for participation in
the informal credit market (third column). This evidence has as least
two possible explanations.
This result provide a ￿rst evidence with respect to targeting rules.
On the one hand, the choice of micro￿nance institutions to provide credit
to landless households may induce rationing for landed households, who
are more likely pushed towards bank lending rather than towards the
informal market.
On the other hand, it is possible that landed households have more
access to bank lending since they are endowed with collateral ￿ which is
more often required in bank loans than in other types of contracts, as
we saw in Table 1￿and they voluntarily choose to borrow from banks
rather than from other credit providers33.
A corollary of these arguments, supported by the non signi￿cance
of the dummy "target" in the informal market participation equation,
is also the possible voluntary or forced choice ￿ not determined by land
endowment￿to borrow from the informal sector. This occurs even if
some terms of the agreement are not convenient with respect to other
types of credit (interest rates).
Indeed, a signi￿cant determinant of the choice to borrow from infor-
mal lenders is our measure of adverse shocks, captured by the cases of
tuberculosis within a household34. This phenomenon is not present in
micro￿nance and bank loans. There are several explanations that may
account for it.
First, it is plausible that the destination of a loan is less likely to
be productive where the borrower has been hit by a shock (e.g. in case
of an injury sums are often used to buy medicines or to pay doctors).
Thus, peers may not be willing to form a group with people su⁄ering
shocks. Hence, a negative event may end up to be a factor that creates
rationing in micro￿nance programs due to group selection mechanisms.
Second, banks may or may not be informed about shocks occurred
to potential customers and the relatively high risk embedded in a non
productive loan. If they are informed, they will be reluctant to lend,
unless the market value of collateral is greater than the sum due at
maturity. If they are not, it is even possible that collateral has such a
high value for his/her owner that he/she prefers to resort to other forms
of lending rather than facing a high probability of loosing it. Also in this
33This e⁄ect is in line with Madajewicz (1999), who shows that the impact of
peer monitored loans on pro￿ts declines with wealth among the poor, relative to the
impact of individual loans.
34As expected, measles and malaria are not signi￿cant in our regressions, possibly
due to the extremely low number of observations.
19case we end up with a form of credit rationing. This and the previous
argument may explain a forced choice of informal markets in case of
idiosyncratic negative shocks.
Third, as previously mentioned, the ￿ exible structure of informal
credit, is likely to be particularly appealing in situations where an ad-
verse shock occurs to the household. In fact, despite the presence higher
interest rates, informal lenders are more ￿ exible (Tibmerg and Ayiar,
1984) and more willing to grant terms renegotiation in case of di¢ culty.
This might explain a voluntary choice of informal markets in case of
idiosyncratic negative shocks.
Pushing further the empirical analysis in order to gauge more infor-
mation on which is the stronger e⁄ect among those described so far, is
certainly a di¢ cult task given the scarce number of available observa-
tions on informal agreements. However, exogenous factors driving the
choice of borrowers towards informal lending, bank credit and micro￿-
nance, suggest that informal credit market may represent a complement
of micro￿nance and bank lending, rather than a substitute of the re-
maining two.
In particular, it seems that when some project is planned, households
are more likely to resort to micro￿nance institutions or banks in order
to get ￿nanced, and they split between these two markets basing on
land status. Conversely, when facts are unexpected and future events
involve high uncertainty, households end up to be ￿nanced by informal
moneylenders, either because they cannot access the other markets (too
much risk) or by voluntary choice (possibly driven by high ￿ exibility
features of this market).
Turning to the other determinants of credit choice, we ￿nd that the
number of siblings alive is a positive and highly signi￿cant determinant
of access to micro￿nance (second column). This possibly supports the
idea, already mentioned in previous sections, that the social network sur-
rounding the household may be extremely important to both achieving a
good knowledge of the opportunities o⁄ered by micro￿nance institutions
and to easily constitute a group.
By the same token, it is quite plausible that the high signi￿cance of
the sharecropper status in order to access informal credit (third column)
is due to a strong relationship with the landlord, who is also likely to be
a moneylender.
It seems that owning a house has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect
in inducing participation to microlending. However, this result should
be taken carefully. Micro￿nance institutions, in fact, try to raise con-
sciousness recommending their participants to build up their own houses.
Therefore, we suppose that the high signi￿cance of the parameter is due
20to the e⁄ectiveness of this advice but it is also extremely endogenous.
Finally, Islamic religion35 negatively a⁄ects microcredit participa-
tion. This result may have several explanations. One example could
be the compliance with Islamic religious customs, which do not allow
pre-arranged interest rates, but rely instead on pro￿t and loss sharing
principles36. Indeed, this is also re￿ ected in the negative sign of bank
participation. Informal lenders may instead accord more ￿ exibility in in-
terest rates arrangements as well. The negative relation between Islamic
religion and partipation to micro￿nance programs may also represent
a wealth e⁄ect. In fact Islamic, rather than Hindu households, are on
average richer.
[Table 4 about here]
5.2 Cumulative credit
Results in Table 5 show that informal borrowing mainly grows with
the quantity of land owned and it is highly plausible that this captures
the role of land as a collateral37. In fact, since moneylenders are often
landlords, this form of guarantee can be particularly appealing for them.
Another interesting feature is the positive e⁄ect that land owned by
siblings has on bank lending (third column). This should re￿ ect the fact
that banks often accept personal guarantees from close, and obviously
richer, relatives.
This feature is reversed in informal loans with regard to children
owning land 38 (third column), meaning that the higher the number of
daughters and sons owning land, the lower the amount of informal credit
borrowed from moneylenders. This may be explained by wealth e⁄ects.
In fact, when one has many children owning land she/he is supposed to
be richer. If it is true that informal lending occurs following unexpected
negative events, it is possible that richer households use their own savings
to face these shocks.
Land seems to be the only collateral required, since the dummy that
identi￿es whether other assets ￿ a house or transport￿has been inherited
35The dummy takes a value of 1 if the religion of the households is Islam and zero
if religion is Hindu.
36See for example Lewis and Algaud for details on Islamic ￿nancial contracts.
37With 2SLS estimation techniques (see Table A2 in the Appendix) is possible to
observe that this evidence is also present in bank lending.
38See also Table A3 in the Appendix where this e⁄ect is also evident in micro￿-
nance. However, we should take these results carefully since the Heckman estimation
procedure does not provide signi￿cant results.
21is not signi￿cant. However, this statement must be taken carefully. In
fact, land represents a proxy of the wealth status of a household39. Thus,
it may be positively correlated with other assets ownership, like gold,
which is also frequently required as a loan guarantee.
Other controls, such as age, education, gender of the household head,
etc. are almost never signi￿cant in our regressions.
Finally, it is worth to observe that Mills lambdas are negative and
signi￿cant in each estimated equation for cumulative credit. Thus, the
higher the probability of participation in a given credit market ￿ identi￿ed
by factors such as negative shocks or land ownership￿ the lower the
sum borrowed in that market. This seems quite reasonable, at least for
micro￿nance and informal credit.
[Table 5 about here]
5.3 Investment
Table 6 (second column) reports estimates of the impact of the three
di⁄erent types of credit on investment.
Program credit parameter is positive and signi￿cant at 1 per cent
level, while informal and bank credit are positive and signi￿cant at 10
per cent level in the investment equation. Moreover, where they are
signi￿cant, informal and bank credit parameters are lower than micro￿-
nance ones.
As a consequence, our results show that microlending has a higher
impact than informal and bank credit on investment and that bank loans
have the lowest impact. These discrepancies should not be ascribable to
any feature of credit agreements which is not speci￿ed in the regressions,
in particular neither to the cost of credit nor to the presence of collateral.
Di⁄erences should instead re￿ ect all the characteristics of microlend-
ing that are not included as regressors in the investment equation. These
features may include the role of non credit services, the monitoring sys-
tem set up by peers, the presence of social sanctions and future credit
denial in case of default40. As discussed in the previous sections, these
39As it occurs for borrowers, the measure relatives￿wealth can be captured by
land ownership. Moreover, the presence of borrowers￿and relatives￿land ownership
is extremely important in order to clear residuals from components that might re￿ ect
income or wealth and that may be correlated with our instruments.
40Some of may represent incentives that are positively linked to the presence of
social ties. This could also explain the di⁄erence between the informal and bank
credit estimated parameters.
22elements are considered the strength of micro￿nance and seem to be
e⁄ective in order to promote a responsible use of sums borrowed.
In order to test wheter borrowed funds are diverted toward the ac-
quisition of other inputs, in the third column we also report estimates
for semi-￿xed capital stock. We ￿nd that credit of whatever nature has
a non signi￿cant e⁄ect on it. Our interpretation for these ￿ndings is that
credit is not used to buy expensive assets. Conversely, household that
need to borrow are strongly input constrained. In fact, the negative sign
of the (although not signi￿cant) parameters suggests that borrowers own
on average less semi-￿xed assets as those who are not borrowing.
Paying attention to the other determinants of investment, and ac-
cording to the theory (Ghosh, Mokherjee and Ray, 2000), we expect
that, if investment is interpreted as e⁄ort, interest rate should have a
negative impact on it while collateral should do the opposite. These el-
ements emerge from our estimates, particularly with respect to interest
rates41.
Islamic religion plays a positive role in determining investment. As
we discussed above with regard to credit market participation this could
again represent a wealth e⁄ect.
Total area cultivated negatively a⁄ects investment, as well as the
stock of semi-￿xed assets. This is obviously no surprise due to decreasing
returns.
Semi-￿xed assets are also positively a⁄ected by the education of the
household head and the number of children alive. The ￿rst might in part
be a wealth e⁄ect ￿ educated persons are also richer￿while the second
might be an inter-generational one. In fact, farmers who have many
children are perhaps more willing to hold ￿xed assets that tomorrow
will be inherited by their children.
Finally, parents owning land also negatively determines the stock
of semi-￿xed assets. The reason can be that in low income and high
solidarity environments people borrow expensive assets to their relatives
rather than buying them (for example the same plough may be used by
many farmers during the same crop season).
[Table 5 about here]
41We also estimated a model without interest rates and collateral as controls in
equation (1). Results do not substantially change with respect to credit parame-
ters, possibly supporting the fact that all discussed devices set up by micro￿nance
programs are more e⁄ective than traditional ones (i.e. collateral).
235.4 Robustness
Comparing results of the Heckman selection model with those reported
in the Appendix for the other two estimation techniques, it seems that
endogeneity in the credit market42, together with other possible biases
arising from the censored nature of credit and self-selection mechanisms,
are relevant issues43.
Possibly for this reason, 2SLS (Table A4 in the Appendix) pro-
vide non signi￿cant parameters for all types of credit, while estimates
start becoming signi￿cant once we adopt models that account for biases
(2STobit and Heckman). In particular, parameters associated to infor-
mal and bank lending are not signi￿cant unless we correct for market
selection with the Heckman procedure.
Furthermore, Sargan (1958) test for overidenti￿cation (statistics are
reported at the bottom of Tables 6, A4 and A5) does not reject the joint
null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid and the model
is correctly speci￿ed.
Finally, the hypothesis of no correlation among the errors of the equa-
tions in the system could not be rejected at 1 per cent signi￿cance level
for all equations in the Tobit and Selection speci￿cations44. Therefore,
our choice to separately estimate equations (1-4) seems appropriate.
[Table 6 about here]
42In fact, Hausman-Durbin-Wu (Durbin, 1954; Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978) test
for endogeneity rejects the null hypothesis that an OLS estimator yields consistent
estimates in the variable inputs equation. Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-sq statistic for
variable inputs is 10.679. The opposite holds for the semi-￿xed assets equation (Chi-
sq=0.271). However, for coherence in the estimation procedures we use instruments
for the semi-￿xed assets equation as well. This would provide less e¢ cient (but
consistent) estimates.
43As an example, suppose that the sharecropper status is a positive determinant
of informal market participation, as it actually is. By estimating an equation where
the dependent variable is total amount of loans with a 2SLS or 2STobit, one may
infer that sharecroppers borrow a higher quantity of money from informal lenders
(see table A2 in the Appendix). However, this might not be the right interpretation,
since it does not distinguish among the higher propensity for this category of farmers
to borrow from informal lenders (participation e⁄ect) and the quantity of funds they
are able to rise (volume e⁄ect). The comparison between results of the ￿rst and the
second stage of the Heckman model can help disentangling this problem.
44However, the test on 2SLS brings ambiguous results, since it does not reject the
null hypothesis of no correlation between microlending or bank credit and variable
inputs, while it does for informal credit.
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As a consequence of the rapid growth of micro￿nance, a considerable
number of papers concerning the impact of these lending programs on
poverty reduction has been written so far. Many studies analyze the
e⁄ects of the major institutions, like the Grameen Bank, on some house-
hold behavior and most part provide evidence that microcredit programs
can reduce poverty through productive capital provision.
However, there are no works focusing on investment. Moreover, there
is no attempt to compare the impact of di⁄erent credit agreements on
households behaviors.
Using data from a World Bank survey carried out in Bangladesh
during the period 1991/1992, we estimate and compare the impact of
micro￿nance ￿ mainly operating through group loans￿and other credit
contracts ￿ informal and bank ones￿on agricultural investment.
Results show that borrowers belonging to a group lending program
invest more in variable inputs than borrowers who receive loans from
an informal lender or a bank. These ￿ndings should not be ascribable
to any measurable feature of credit agreements, in particular to interest
rates and collateral required, which have been taken into consideration
while running our estimates.
Regression outcomes are more likely to provide evidence that unmea-
surable characteristics of microlending are e⁄ective means to promote
borrowers￿e⁄ort and a responsible use of funds.
Incentives set up by micro￿nance institutions in order to minimize
the rate of project defaults ￿ the peer monitoring system, social sanctions
and future credit denial in case of default, together with some non credit
services￿are almost all non measurable elements, and possibly account
for a large portion of the di⁄erence in the estimated parameters for the
three types of credit.
Furthermore, in order to solve the problems of endogeneity and cen-
soring nature of credit, we obtain interesting information on credit mar-
ket selection mechanism.
We ￿nd that household who participate to program lending are land-
less, as predicted by the Grameen and other similar programs￿eligibility
rules set up to select poor households. Conversely, owning land, and hav-
ing relatives who own land allows a privileged access to bank lending,
possibly due to a collateral e⁄ect. But land ownwership may also imply
that bank borrowers are more likely to be rationed from micro￿nance
programs.
Informal credit is instead frequently chosen by agents who are subject
to an adverse shock ￿ such as a serious desease￿and perhaps require ￿ ex-
ibility in the structure of the credit agreement, with particular attention
25to the repayment schedule. Another interpretation which is compatible
with our results is that informal borrowers may su⁄er rationing by other
lenders due to the high riskiness associated with the use of their loan.
Finally, micro￿nance borrowers have a more solid relationship net
within the community where they belong ￿ as measured by the num-
ber of relatives alive and living in the village￿and this perhaps allows
them to easily ￿nd contacts in order to constitute or have access to a
group. In contrast, we ￿nd that informal borrowers have a speci￿c bi-
lateral relationship with the lender (as in the case of sharecroppers and
landlords).
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Standard errors in parenthesis   
† 1,798 households, among those 1,084 are borrowers 
† 
† 516 households, among those 337 are borrowers 
 





Table 2 – Investment and semi-fixed assets 
     
Per-acre investment in variable expenditure (taka) 
    345 
(422) 
















Table 3 - Instruments 
     
 
MICROFINANCE PROGRAMS:    222 hh 






0.8  %  
1.3  % 
     
INFORMAL MARKET:    66 hh 








     
BANKS:    49 hh 
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Table 4 – Credit Market Selection (First Step Heckman Estimation Procedure) 
 
Dependent variable is: 
obtain loan (dummy) 
 
MF Programs  Informal Credit  Bank Credit 
Religion  -0.339*  0.121  -0.073 
  (0.199)  (0.308)  (0.416) 
Tenure: Fixed rent  0.166  -0.041  -0.061 
  (0.205)  (0.221)  (0.307) 
Tenure: Sharecropper  0.011  0.553***  0.447* 
  (0.191)  (0.203)  (0.239) 
N. parents own land  -0.027  0.066  -0.130 
  (0.108)  (0.132)  (0.173) 
N. siblings own land  -0.054  0.018  0.035 
  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.045) 
N. daughs.-sons  own land  -0.018  0.019  -0.022 
  (0.051)  (0.037)  (0.044) 
N. parents alive  -0.071  -0.178  -0.225 
  (0.111)  (0.123)  (0.153) 
N. siblings alive  0.085***  -0.018  0.004* 
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.002) 
N. daughs.-sons  alive  0.040  -0.001  -0.007 
  (0.031)  (0.028)  (0.035) 
Land owned  0.319***  -0.004  0.008 
  (0.120)  (0.026)  (0.031) 
Own a house  1.130***  -0.201  0.112 
  (0.247)  (0.298)  (0.329) 
Own transport  -0.797  1.166*  -4.894 
  (0.786)  (0.691)  (0.000) 
Target  22.765***  -0.360  -1.143*** 
  (1.167)  (0.225)  (0.268) 
Injured (TBC)  -0.206  0.753**  -0.210 
  (0.393)  (0.309)  (0.481) 
Constant  -22.808  -1.481  -6.882 
  (0.000)  (1.411)  (0.000) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Other controls: age of the hh head, age of the hh spouse, education of the hh head, education of the hh 
spouse, gender of the hh head, number of persons in the household, other relatives own land/alive, malaria, 
measles 
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Table 5 – Cumulative Credit (Second Step Heckman Estimation Procedure) 
 
Dependent variable is: 
Cumulative credit (in taka) 
 
MF programs  Informal Credit  Bank Credit 
Religion  -1,728.480  -1,451.052  -24,245.903 
  (1,056.152)  (2,503.150)  (35,143.413) 
Tenure: Fixed rent  -750.010  220.043  28,339.855 
  (790.298)  (1,689.410)  (26,127.136) 
Tenure: Sharecropper  -357.946  -3,728.179*  -20,727.125 
  (728.095)  (2,140.168)  (23,328.709) 
N. parents own land  101.568  -1,080.212  -13,826.375 
  (457.821)  (1,033.326)  (19,570.975) 
N. siblings own land  -81.838  -204.435  13,719.035*** 
  (143.667)  (340.327)  (3,869.293) 
N. daughs.-sons  own land  -34.271  -766.351**  -1,915.969 
  (156.798)  (339.220)  (3,430.287) 
N. parents alive  -111.043  1,205.643  -10,717.390 
  (433.545)  (966.526)  (15,646.435) 
N. siblings alive  -181.425  485.584*  2,500.547 
  (150.092)  (271.656)  (2,689.265) 
N. daughs.-sons  alive  -124.200  96.422  -145.804 
  (123.689)  (198.466)  (2,894.771) 
Land owned  -571.673  1,689.024***  273.385 
  (474.843)  (531.026)  (1,649.857) 
Own a house  -1,384.886  -2,986.623  -53,019.705* 
  (1,362.606)  (2,423.003)  (31,220.039) 
Own transport  -363.166  -2,216.386   
  (2,266.157)  (5,599.009)   
Mills lambda  -4,525.384*  -5,542.561*  -44,029.980** 
  (2,680.751)  (3,278.665)  (19,091.877) 
Constant  9,923.575**  2,937.468  147,679.812* 
  (4,787.616)  (7,276.396)  (80,298.521) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Other controls: age of the hh head, age of the hh spouse, education of the hh head, education of the hh spouse, gender 
of the hh head, number of persons in the household, other relatives own land/alive 





Table 6 – Investment and Semi-Fixed Assets  (Heckman Estimation Procedure) 
 
 Dependent variable is: 
 per-acre investment; 
 per-acre stock of semi-fixed assets 
 
Investment  Semi-Fixed Assets 
MF Programs  0.044***  -0.282 
  (0.008)  (0.342) 
Informal credit  0.017*  -0.004 
  (0.010)  (0.171) 
Bank Credit  0.003*  -0.049 
  (0.001)  (0.124) 
Religion  116.153**  -1,192.520 
  (57.727)  (980.061) 
Tenure: Fixed rent  21.626  245.375 
  (38.459)  (652.933) 
Tenure: Sharecropper  -57.109  -878.390 
  (34.734)  (589.707) 
N. parents own land  -12.102  -757.923** 
  (21.764)  (369.496) 
N. siblings own land  -1.689  131.421 
  (6.997)  (118.797) 
N. daughs.-sons  own land  11.942*  -15.694 
  (6.268)  (106.417) 
N. parents alive  15.631  427.793 
  (21.255)  (360.854) 
N. siblings alive  -5.699  -166.635* 
  (5.828)  (98.944) 
N. daughs.-sons  alive  -8.094  250.048*** 
  (5.381)  (91.364) 
Collateral  73.066  3,462.828* 
  (118.068)  (2,004.503) 
Interest rate  -6.536**  -239.074** 
  (2.681)  (106.431) 
Total area cultivated  -44.557***  -1,097.515*** 
  (17.110)  (290.482) 
Days stop work (illness)  3.379*  -36.682 
  (1.810)  (30.731) 
Use: personal  -13.950  -390.851 
  (46.393)  (787.642) 
Use: dowry  0.518  -2,098.969 
  (127.259)  (2,160.542) 
Nonfarm activities  53.332  -164.705 
  (34.985)  (593.957) 
Lender  32.158  863.640 
  (78.709)  (1,336.281) 
Constant  -10.473  3,717.700 
  (200.447)  (3,403.097) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Variable inputs: Sargan Chi-sq(1)  0.031       Semi fixed assets: Sargan Chi-sq(1) 0.022         
 
Other controls: age of the hh head, age of the hh spouse, education of the hh head, education of the hh spouse, gender 


























‡  516  0.86  0.35  0.00  1.00 
Age household head  516  42.05  12.99  18.00  85.00 
Age household spouse  516  32.18  14.00  0.00
†  67.00 
Education household head (years)  516  3.56  3.72  0.00  14.00 
Education household spouse (years)  516  1.76  2.69  0.00  12.00 
Household head is male
‡  516  0.99  0.12  0.00  1.00 
N. of persons in the house  516  5.80  2.46  1.00  17.00 
Land tenure: fixed rent
‡  516  0.25  0.43  0.00  1.00 
Land tenure: sharecropper
‡  516  0.52  0.50  0.00  1.00 
N. Parents own land  516  0.88  1.09  0.00  4.00 
N. Siblings own land  516  3.87  3.57  0.00  16.00 
N. daughs.-sons  own land  516  1.48  3.22  0.00  20.00 
N. Other relatives own land  516  3.59  4.35  0.00  26.00 
N. Parents alive  516  1.76  1.27  0.00  4.00 
N. Siblings alive  516  8.14  3.85  0.00  25.00 
N. daughs.-sons  alive  516  6.88  4.64  0.00  24.00 
N. Other relatives alive  516  6.32  5.51  0.00  32.00 
Land owned  516  1.21  2.93  0.00  52.50 
Own a house
‡  516  0.17  0.37  0.00  1.00 
Own transport
‡  516  0.01  0.12  0.00  1.00 
Non-farm activities
‡  516  0.38  0.49  0.00  1.00 
Household lends money
‡  516  0.04  0.20  0.00  1.00 
Total area cultivated (acres)  516  1.16  1.21  0.03  8.20 
Use of loan: personal
‡  313*  0.03  0.17  0.00  1.00 
Use of loan: dowry
‡  313*  0.28  0.45  0.00  1.00 
N. days stop work  28**  11.68  12.10  0.00  45.00 
 
†    Minimum age of household spouse if alive is 15 
‡    Dummy variable 
*   Computed on the number of borrowers 
** Computed on TBC injured 
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Table A2 – Cumulative Credit (First Stage Least Squares Estimation Procedure) 
 
Dependent variable is: 
Cumulative credit (in taka) 
 
MF Programs  Informal Credit  Bank Credit 
Religion  -2,013.743***  -258.521  -227.505 
  (628.529)  (270.956)  (3,271.124) 
Tenure: Fixed rent  86.672  16.993  1,326.777 
  (426.085)  (183.683)  (2,217.520) 
Tenure: Sharecropper  -517.411  355.809**  1,800.445 
  (379.348)  (163.535)  (1,974.284) 
N. parents own land  71.395  -37.180  -1,582.648 
  (242.319)  (104.463)  (1,261.129) 
N. siblings own land  -102.719  1.006  959.097** 
  (74.440)  (32.091)  (387.415) 
N. daughs.-sons  own land  -70.947  -55.766*  -237.721 
  (70.680)  (30.470)  (367.848) 
N. parents alive  -275.395  -75.329  -1,280.659 
  (233.475)  (100.650)  (1,215.099) 
N. siblings alive  85.574  13.021  374.432 
  (64.070)  (27.620)  (333.447) 
N. daughs.-sons  alive  26.140  18.684  332.433 
  (59.189)  (25.516)  (308.041) 
Land owned  -16.556  57.102*  840.252** 
  (70.150)  (30.241)  (365.092) 
Own a house  2,316.015***  -210.069  -1,237.283 
  (504.557)  (217.512)  (2,625.919) 
Own transport  -1,485.730  707.970  -1,427.710 
  (1,530.124)  (659.628)  (7,963.390) 
Target  3,524.666***  -378.577*  -2,797.011 
  (490.510)  (211.456)  (2,552.813) 
Injured (TBC)  -632.198  855.349***  -1,086.685 
  (747.293)  (322.154)  (3,889.220) 
Constant  3,558.914  -200.687  8,940.063 
  (3,002.431)  (1,294.332)  (15,625.880) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
R2 MF Programs=0.42; R2 informal credit=0.38; R2 bank credit=0.31 
 
Other controls: age of the hh head, age of the hh spouse, education of the hh head, education of the hh spouse, gender 
of the hh head, number of persons in the household, other relatives own land/alive, malaria, measles 
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Table A3 – Cumulative Credit (First Stage Tobit Estimation Procedure) 
 
Dependent variable is: 
Cumulative credit (in taka) 
 
MF programs
†  Informal Credit
††  Bank Credit
††† 
Religion  -3,322.128***  -482.660  -3,062.471 
  (1,232.023)  (1,692.174)  (23,131.525) 
Tenure: Fixed rent  793.387  -103.586  -823.565 
  (899.708)  (1,221.605)  (16,681.910) 
Tenure: Sharecropper  -990.622  2,950.285***  23,598.123* 
  (836.470)  (1,139.201)  (13,063.287) 
N. parents own land  -388.557  190.360  -12,238.537 
  (520.370)  (725.356)  (10,265.643) 
N. siblings own land  -373.273**  80.714  4,986.561** 
  (161.436)  (210.893)  (2,384.236) 
N. daughs.-sons  own land  -554.262***  -55.060  -1,483.800 
  (159.478)  (202.213)  (2,400.559) 
N. parents alive  -221.936  -935.325  -16,351.455* 
  (491.297)  (668.259)  (8,695.287) 
N. siblings alive  357.344**  -45.536  1,964.762 
  (141.324)  (176.107)  (2,125.688) 
N. daughs.-sons  alive  136.343  54.391  136.328 
  (134.835)  (149.090)  (1,922.191) 
Land owned  -1,020.020***  70.482*  909.023 
  (374.231)  (41.483)  (1,333.823) 
Own a house  6,628.350***  -1,358.052  -8,922.539 
  (915.401)  (1,668.751)  (18,865.901) 
Own transport  -1,217.269  5,669.651  -266,024.375 
  (2,811.397)  (3,795.052)  (0.000) 
Target  542.446*  -2,483.011**  -59,011.797*** 
  (309.626)  (1,244.608)  (15,256.182) 
Injured (TBC)  -936.770  4,126.374**  -30,945.565 
  (1,584.244)  (1,655.363)  (30,389.153) 
Constant  2,662.989  -10,338.651  -221.245 
  (6,569.384)  (7,553.340)  (73,707.475) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 





Other controls: age of the hh head, age of the hh spouse, education of the hh head, education of the hh spouse, gender 
of the hh head, number of persons in the household, other relatives own land/alive, malaria, measles 
   39 
 
 
Table A4 – Investment and Semi-Fixed Assets  (Second Stage Least Squares Estimation Procedure) 
 
 Dependent variable is: 
 per-acre investment; 
per-acre stock of semi-fixed assets 
 
Investment  Semi-Fixed Assets 
MF Programs  -0.405  0.460 
  (0.852)  (3.608) 
Informal credit  0.364  -0.244 
  (0.598)  (2.532) 
Bank Credit  0.063  -0.184 
  (0.138)  (0.586) 
Religion  -446.943  76.009 
  (1,307.968)  (5,538.595) 
Tenure: Fixed rent  4.481  192.340 
  (249.597)  (1,056.918) 
Tenure: Sharecropper  -109.441  -811.273 
  (186.980)  (791.768) 
N. parents own land  85.120  -908.952 
  (213.778)  (905.243) 
N. siblings own land  -50.498  188.007 
  (91.882)  (389.076) 
N. daughs.-sons  own land  36.862  -8.963 
  (61.071)  (258.604) 
N. parents alive  -38.007  583.342 
  (138.087)  (584.729) 
N. siblings alive  -11.231  -178.942 
  (32.042)  (135.683) 
N. daughs.-sons  alive  -25.518  274.318 
  (41.763)  (176.845) 
Collateral  -485.843  5,631.026 
  (1,724.317)  (7,301.627) 
Interest rate  163.015  -224.693 
  (330.442)  (142.190) 
Total area cultivated  -237.706  -773.141 
  (360.497)  (1,526.525) 
Days stop work (illness)  30.224  -108.373 
  (66.094)  (279.875) 
Use: personal  -228.960  -459.126 
  (391.645)  (1,658.423) 
Use: dowry  -535.269  -1,853.115 
  (1,133.997)  (4,801.917) 
Nonfarm activities  146.286  -0.585 
  (374.337)  (1,585.131) 
Lender  160.937  537.683 
  (798.027)  (3,379.249) 
Constant  411.224  2,623.295 
  (1,171.183)  (4,959.379) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
R2 variable inputs=0.23; R2 fixed assets=0.21 
Variable inputs: Sargan Chi-sq(1)  0.253        Semi fixed assets: Sargan Chi-sq(1)  0.052         
 
Other controls: age of the hh head, age of the hh spouse, education of the hh head, education of the hh spouse, 
gender of the hh head, number of persons in the household, other relatives own land/alive 
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Table A5 – Investment and Semi-Fixed Assets  (Second Stage Tobit Estimation Procedure) 
 
 Dependent variable is: 
 per-acre investment;  
 per-acre stock of semi-fixed assets 
 
Investment  Semi-Fixed Assets 
MF Programs  0.028***  -0.198 
  (0.010)  (0.174) 
Informal credit  0.004  -0.305 
  (0.039)  (0.646) 
Bank Credit  0.009  0.050 
  (0.007)  (0.121) 
Religion  84.114  -976.077 
  (60.224)  (1,007.484) 
Tenure: Fixed rent  15.033  294.382 
  (39.184)  (655.505) 
Tenure: Sharecropper  -72.697**  -695.099 
  (36.533)  (611.159) 
N. parents own land  -12.010  -716.266* 
  (22.215)  (371.628) 
N. siblings own land  -2.920  79.265 
  (7.081)  (118.451) 
N. daughs.-sons  own land  10.793  -1.947 
  (6.577)  (110.026) 
N. parents alive  13.907  508.012 
  (22.402)  (374.758) 
N. siblings alive  -5.990  -172.559* 
  (6.045)  (101.127) 
N. daughs.-sons  alive  -10.146*  249.176*** 
  (5.490)  (91.841) 
Collateral  43.747  3,423.066* 
  (122.442)  (2,048.332) 
Interest rate  -2.272  -232.992** 
  (2.619)  (106.985) 
Total area cultivated  -42.047**  -1,145.622*** 
  (17.154)  (286.966) 
Days stop work (illness)  2.172  -16.239 
  (1.802)  (30.151) 
Use: personal  -10.861  -426.072 
  (47.501)  (794.636) 
Use: dowry  -14.360  -1,887.308 
  (129.842)  (2,172.131) 
Nonfarm activities  53.535  -191.873 
  (35.761)  (598.239) 
Lender  29.170  1,093.040 
  (79.884)  (1,336.371) 
Constant  342.130***  3,452.098 
  (10.650)  (3,462.320) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Variable inputs: Sargan Chi-sq(1)  0.027       Semi fixed assets: Sargan Chi-sq(1) 0.021         
 
Other controls: age of the hh head, age of the hh spouse, education of the hh head, education of the hh spouse, 
gender of the hh head, number of persons in the household, other relatives own land/alive 







Table A6 – Two-sample t test with equal variances on TBC injured  
 
Variables: proxies of wealth  Mean if not 
injured (1) 















































































Standard errors in parentheses 







Table A7 – Two-sample t test with equal variances on TBC injured 
 
Variable: principal  Mean if not 
injured (1) 























































Standard errors in parentheses 
†  H0: difference = 0 
(a) d.f.=220   
(b) d.f.= 64     
(c) d.f.= 47 
 